ı. Introduction
This article is about how change at the international system level has produced those political outcomes rcIatcd to sccurity and defence desil:,rnin the ı990s Europe. il is both a description and evaluation of the way the European security arcna has changcd as wcll as an attcmpt to comc to terms with the process that kd ta 'internalisation' of system change. By using the term 'internalisation' we mcan the process, or better, the causal reJationship betwccn system change and policy response. Our argument is that the nature of the post-Cold War systemic reality has bccn instrumental in sustaining and even inereasing actars' faith in co-opcrative frameworks and in further collcctive behaviour and interaction in European sccurity and defence.
Although highly unoriginal, there is no other way but to indicate, right from the beginning, that historyand geography, which tight bipolarity had kept in limbo for over forty years, have re-emerged as factors reconstituting Europe's identity. The scopc of political change, the rapidity with which events are known the world over. and the complexities involvcd in trying to understand the new sccurity chaIlenges have bcen and continue to be discussed. Our traditional conception of the classic factors of power in analysing and explaining the changing security environment is still relevant. The difference today is 'the reach of impact. the complexity of the causal process, the range and capabilities of actors involved. and the YOL. XXVI aeknowlcdgement that threat and response are no longer within the sole or even primary purview of the military'.l Against this baekground, the diseussion in the following pages addresses two important dimensions of current international concem: firstly the evolution of the European sccurity system as we approaeh 2000. it takes aeeount of the ehanging propcrties of world politics sinee the collapse of bipolarity and attempts to assess the extent to which structure, power and actors have acquired new meanings und er the impact of uneertainty and unpredietability that have foııowed the tectonic shifts in world affairs. Seeondly, the extent to which the strategic ramifications of the new geopolitical realities and the new seeurity challenges, allhough lacking a unified eoneept of threat, can adequately 'provide' rules for st3te interaetion and most importantly for graduaııy reinforeing 'institutionalisation' of seeurity. In the eontext of the latter, the analysis is direcLCd towards the examination of NATO's insLİtutional response and adaptation LOthe new struetural elemenı,> and assesses the development of strategies, both national and institutional, as well as the formulation of effcctive policies.
(Re)conceptualizing Security in the 1990s
Any diseussion about the prospects of a new system of eolleetive sccurity in Europe -as they have bccn expressed through the dccisions taken in Maastricht, Amsterdam, Berlin and Madrid -should lake account of the eonstituent elem en LS of change that produeed the 'new order'.2 This 'new world order' has com e to symbolise, for many, a set of expectaLİons and hopes, few of them strikingly elear or well articulated, and even fewer so far fulfilled. If there is to be a new order it will have to emerge not simply out of the ashes of the old, but rather in a dynamic tension with the powerful legaey of great-power war and resulting international insLİtution-building during this century. There is, therefore, a critical evaluatİon problem which is linked to the necd for eoneeptuaIization of the ehanging 'European order'. There are, essentially, four dimensions to this problcmatiquc: the first has to do with the nature and character of 'ordcr' in general. The second has to do with the concept of change. The third concerns the response(s) to the process and the products of change, and the founh addresses 'the issue of impact, and the ways in which changes in the order and in the actions of major participants fecd into further processes of change' that inlluences both the nature of the wholc (system) and the behaviour of the parı<;(state or other units).3 At an empirical level, the changing nature of the order can be linked to a series of important developments. First and foremost, it is the existence of structural change that produces a rearrangement of European state relationships especially in the field of world economy, More and more, 'globalization' enhanees the interdependence of national economies, and undermines the traditional relationship between state power and market. Globalizing production and global finance transforms global economy into a system of 'governance without government,.4
Closely linkcd with this process, is the emergence of new states in Europe and henee the need to trace the components of the new European system. At the same time, revision of the economic and security status outside Europe have raised questions about the boundaries of the system and the interests of the European state actors. More often than in the past, there are newand sometimes unexpected Iinkages between political, security and economic concerns, which have challenge the capacity of the state both to reeognize and to respond to new challenges and needs for action. Finally, there has bcen an institutional challenge relating to the adcquacy of existing institutions for international action, and to the potemial for coordination bctwecn state and other non-state (transnational and subnational) forees. This last issue is of paramount importance for Europc: European transnaLİonal forces combincd with fragmenLİng subnational forces creatc ambiguity anf fluidity. The European Union forms an 'island of peacc' -a unity of transnaLİonal networks and a comman retrenchment from a violent pcriphery. Pamdoxically, however, these process es are alsa reproduced within the single state with naLİonal networks, securİly zones and area<;of violence. Transnational forces and the growth of cosmopolitanism have wcakened the nation-state, but this very challenge has led to the emcrgence of nationalist reactions and to the legiLİmizing of subnaLİonal-seccesionist forces. As Hassner put it, 'the nation-state is bOlh obsolete and obstinate'.5 In Western Europc, the challenge to the naLİon-state comes primarily from the process of integratian and globalization; in the historically imperial Eastern Europc, the chaııenge comes from a reconstructed national-romanic ethnic primordialism which can lead to the disconnection of the assumed unity of state and natian. As the locus of international security shifts in practice from the state LO nation, the unchallenged and uncritical acceptance of the unity of the state and naLİon has become problematic. The amalgam of state/sovereignty is contested within and across international boundaries, as it is confronted by a compcting amalgam: naLİon/identity. The implication is that aILhough the state remains a central actor in the international system, it is not the sole actor in the area of security. Ethnonationalism and identity politics have system-trdnsforming effccts in international relaLİons. 6
In order to respond appropriately to the new conceptual -and eventuaııy -policy challenges, wc must do more than add new issues LO the global agenda. Our thinking about the nature and pursuit of security must change. The attempt to understand the new European order and security should take account of its geographical and functional scopc, İls degree of institutionalization, its strength and fragility and İls ideological and normative clements. While the collapse of the Soviet black and accelerating globalization have fundamentally altered the stmcture of geopolitics, 'our conceptual fmmeworks and menu of policy prescripLİons are indclibly infused with a Cold War political logic'.? The definitian of securİly issues, the way in which they were analyscd, and the policies that resultcd were the product of the dominant geopolitical and ideological environmenL Consequently, security was underswod primarily in military terms, and security studies fixated on the problem of achieving and maintaining a stable balance of A threat to national seeurity in Europe no longer nccessarily evokes images of invading armies. It could be casily argued that there are e1ear limitations to the applieation of eonventional interstate-levcl analysis to the examination of international security in general, and European seeurity in particular. Strategie studies are viewed now as focusing on more than the use of military forcc; seeurity no longer presumes a principal coneentration on ehallenges to a govemment and country from outside its borders; eonnict no longer necessarily means only the violenee of armcd forcc; central governments are no longer viewed as the sole legitimate authoritics for the use of coereive means; defence no longer presumes that military foree is cither the first or the most appropriate instrumenl.
Aıı this amply proves that Laidi is right in stressing that the 'reconstruction of meaning or purpose' and its linking up with the exercise of (military) power cannot be senied through 'any ideologicalar telcological deintoxication which the proponents of Popper's open socieıy seem to be advocating at times'.9 For all that, the divergence between meaning and power cannot be reduccd LO the tension between the integrating logic of the cconomy and the disintegrating dynamic of identity. it triggers off a 'chain' reaction affecting all the factors related to the exercise of political sovereignty, the most important of whieh being the military instrumenl. Russia provides the best example: whilc it remains by far the lcading military power in Europe, the way we view the collapse of Russian power is govemed lcss by its inherent weaknesses than by the faet thattoday there is no underlying plan LO this power. Whieh leads us to the eommonplaee but nontheless essentia! observation: a military power, no maller how large, suffers a considerable loss of meaning the moment it is unable to connecl power with a military policy. LO Moreover, the replacement of the major military threat from the East by multi-levcI and multi-directiona! threats, though admiııedly of lower tension, has Iend great fluidity and instability to the European security system, which was not well-equipped in terms of policies, eompetencies and institutions to dea i with it. it may well be true that the end of the Cold War provides an opportunity to raise the strategie threshold, and thereby reduee substantially the possibility of a global connict; and whiIc, this may be true for Europe, one should not be too sanguine about the prospeets for a 'pcace dividend' in many parts of the world, some of them scaringly close or even inside the 'European perimeter'.
For all that, the new Europe makes prediction about the eourse of international politics difficult. The immense and unique problems posed in the post-Cold War world by the ehallenge of achieving security are pervaded with ambiguity and the dynamics of transformation. In 1990s, poliey-makers eonfront eireumstances that are more diffuse, multiple and uncertain than those faced by carlier generations. The ending of the Cold War has loosencd the bonds of patron-client politics, thereby giying licenee to the rise of micronationalisms, eneouragement to narrow secıoral interests, and legitimaey to unilateral efforts to redraw subnational, national, and even international boundaries. The rulcs are yet to be delined, where the true nature of threats remain shroudcd by their multiplicity and complexity and where it is hard to judge what constitutes winning and losing. ll In straightforward terms, the end of the Cold War has removed the ultima ratio for erude distinctions between friends and foes, between primary and seeondary eonniets. The result has bccn a structural modification of the international stakes, from a vertical paııern (conflicts are not all of equal importanee) to a more horizontal logic (conniets are too complex and too speeific for their settlement to be fungible).12
SeeuriLy challenges beeome even more eomplex when one turns to those issues that may not directly challenge the viability of the state, in traditional terms, but that may neverthcIess undermine the sovereignty of the Slaıe, compromise its ability to control the penetrability of its borders, and exaeerbate relations whether between groups wiLhin the polity or between states within the regional or global system. Increasingly, it is argued that individual and eollective securİly are dependent on our ability lo confront the ılı. N new challenges. Among the new factors that transcend boundaries and threaten to erode national cohesion, the most pcrilous are the so-caııed 'new risks': drug lr'.ıfficking, transnational organised crime and nuclcar smuggling, rcfugee movements, uncontrollcd and iııegal immigration, and environmental risks. 13 These are not new sources of potential conflict. Theyall existed to one extent or another during the Cold War, but were largely subsumed by the threat of military conflict between NATO and the Warsaw PacL Responding to these threats, especially wide environmental degradation in the form cr Communist states, will be an important dimension of preventive defence. The political and economic costs of environmental degradation and mismanagement, such as the high disease rates and safety shoncomings in nuclear plants in the former Soviet Union, are proving to be formidablc challenges to economic development and stability. The simplc recognition of such problcms, however, has not always elicited effective rcsponses from the international community. Instcad, nations have frcquently opted to focus their energies on the more manageablc manifestations of pending conflicts, such as arms buildups, that result from disagreements between nations over nontraditional security issues. 14 Because Europeans face so many dillicult sccurity challenges and promising opportunities, all of which compete for aııemion and resources, it will be difficu!t to tackle these kinds of non-traditional threats. However, somc of them simply will not be ignored for long. The environmental threats posed by the aging nuclcar infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe and form cr Soviet states, inadequate control s over highly emiched uranium and other nuclcar matcrials (induding wcapons-grade matcrials)in Russia, and the deterioration of nuclcar powered vessels (some of which Iiterally are rolling in port) could soon reach crisis proportion. These 'problcms' have not gone umeported. However, much more needs to be accomplished if future disasters are to be avoided. 
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Refugee movemenls and unconırolled and illegal immigraıion represenıs sıill an ol her non-tradiıional ıhreaı lo European securily and slabiliıy. While ıhe mosl publicised refugge flows in the past few years have occurred in Cenlral Africa, more ıhan 800,000 Bosnian refugces remain in Germany and oıher European Slaıes, and almosı 500,00n Albanians enıered Grecce and Italy. Many other refugees have reseuled in Europe afıer flceing or immigraıing from form er colonies. The economic and social burdens these refugees place on govemmenı services have bccome subslanlial. As a resulı, numerous counıries in Europe are beginning lo reexamine ıheir immigraıion policies and enforce more stringenl sıandards. This could have a deslabilizing effccı on the less economically advanced nations in Europc and could threaıen inıer-staıe relaıions. il also could Icad ıo domeslic unresl if more is nol done soon ıo regulalc lhe flow of refugges and expediıe safe repaırialion of those nol accepıed for long ıerm residencc. In lhe inıerim, Europc is experiencing an increase in crime rales and haıe erimes, any of which could Icad LO inslabiliıy and ıhence lo conflicı and insecuriıy.15
These facıors, probably as much as weapons of mass destrucıion proliferaLİon (nuclear, chemical and biological) and ıheir means of delivery, and human-righıs abuses, pose profound challenges lo efforıs lo build a new global order as ıhey are more ıhan capable of contribuıing LOviolence and oıher forms of coercion. Conırary lo oıher global challenges (ıhe communicaLİons revoluıion, waler shorlages, access lo energy resources, financial flows) they call direcıly inıo quesLİon the very auıhorily of lhe Slaıe, and are ıherefore poıenlially, if nol openly, subversive. This mulıifaceıed concepLİon of securily enlails a mulLİfaceıed approach lo securiıy. While an exclusively staıe-centered analysis is capable of illuminaıing some facets of discord and conflict in the i990s (for example, proxy wars and irrcdenlism), it is limiıed by its one dimensional opıic: disıribuLİon and characıer of mililary power. 16 This muILifaceıed/muILidimensional securily concepı means ıhat there is no rigid link belween a comprehensive concepı for underslanding a new silualion and lhe qualiıy of lhe response. On lhe cOnlrary, a broad concept allows a flexible, lailored policy in which force is onlyone of lhe 15Western European Union. European Securlty. p. 13. 16The best exarnple is 1. 1. Mearsheimer. 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the CoId War', International Securlty, Vol. 15(1), 1990. pp. 5.56. He argues that the demise of the Cold War order is likely to increase the chances that war and major crises will occur in Europc: The next decades in a Europe without superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century. but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the pa st 45 years. This pcssimistic conclusion rests on the argument that the distribution and characler of military power are the root causes of war and peacc' (p. 6). various means employed. i7 In the final analysis, security is a politically defined concepL. It is open to debate whether the widening of security might be a good or a bad politica! choice, but security is not intrinsically a selfcontained concept, nar can it be related to military affairs only. If political priorities change, the nature and the means of security will inevitably follow and adapt to the different arcas of political action. iR Finaly, security is multidimensional because individual welfare is more central to policy-making than it was fifly years ago. Individual security can no longer be satisfied only through military measures; it needs a multidimensional understanding. As Politi has noted, 'individual security and international stability are becoming incrcasingly interwined and a security threat is anything that hampers any relevant organization in ensuring individual security'. i9 That mcans that sccurity is elusive; more than ever, it is embedded in the interaction of lacalising and globalising forces. The axes of connict in the shadow of the Cal d War will probably be more complcx, not Icss, and more difficult to manage, not easier. Policies begin to blur traditional dividing lines, both between jurisdietions and between coneepts that were formerly discrete.
So, what does the discussion above mean for the prospects of cooperation in Europe? Contrary to the predietions of Mearsheimer, and the complexity and unpredictability of post-Cold War world politics, lOday's anarchy and multipolarity do not neeessarily undermİne the prospeets of cooperalion, espccially in Europe and in the Atlantic arena. World politics should not be viewed as a historieally frozen rcalm of power-hungry states, but rather as a dynamic process of interaetion among individuals, groups, states, and international institutions, all of which are eapable of adapting their sense of self-interest in response to new information and changing eireumstanees. Under the proper conditions and adaptiye foreign policy responses to them, multipolar systems, not bipolar ones, can produce relativcly grcater stability.
This observation does not ignore the faet that the multipolar systems of the eighteenth and ninetecnth centurics werc structuraııy unstabIc. Morcover, the multipolar system of the eighteenth and ninctccnth ccnturics did not avoid conniet and war. ILuscd war to preservc the essenlial variables of the system, primarily the rights of the major powers, in a status of greatcr 
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or Icsser dynamic equilibrium. This was a dynamic equilibrium subject to much erosion at the edges and uncertainty as to the growth and decline of relative power positions. Europe's security prob/ematique has changed too much in the ı990s and possiblc rcsponses are too different to expect that future security dilcmmas will be clones of those which plagued Europe in the past. In the eighteenth, nineteenth and much of the twentieth century the essential action in the global balance of power was in Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, the European continent is no longer nccessarily the focus of shifting alignments and multilateral security. A balance of power could stili be maintained in Europe but disorderly developments in Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere can affect negatively the stability of the European subsystem. In other words, although a stable Europe may be a necessary condition for world peacc, it is by no means a sufficient condition.
20
Therefore, the connection betwcen multipolarity and European instability is rather simplistic. it could be argued that only when bipolarity is combined with other systemic conditions that European instabilitites may be exacerbatcd. In that sensc, it is not polarity but polarization that can lead to connictual situaLİons. And there is no evidence that such a process will occur in the European sub-system. Detailcd analyses elsewhere 21 show that European and American national responses to the end of the Cold War were conditioned by the highly insLİtutionalised European environment. Not only that, but European governments promoted 'institutionalisation' albeit in different forms (adaptation, reform, consolidation, ete.). This, however, does not mean that insLİtutions have dictated policies. Rather, that they have been used to accommodate national interesl<; and to promote national power and policy preferences in well known cooperative frameworks. it should not escape our attention that national positions and policies renect deeper antitheses which relate to fragilc balances, national visions and extemal orientations and interesl<; both within and ouı"ide the EV system of cooperation. These antithcses derive from the lack of homogeneity of geopolitical pcrspectives, differing concepts or evaluations of extemal threat and dillering national strategies. The result has been a divergence among fundamental interests and consequently the development of divergent national strategic orientations, forei!,'11 policy preferences and approaches. Entering into the security realm is not uncontroversial considering that the EV for a long time professed to be a 'civilian power' lacking military might and ambİlions in the military sphere. The European poliLical system on the 'high politics' lcvel is stili fragmenled into naLion-state units which throughouL history cither used intergovernmenLal cooperation wİlh participation in the Atlantic AlIiance or developed biIaLeral cooperaLions, for example, France and Germany. This means that the European countries have almost always had the willto integrate trade and economic policies, but not to abandan Lheir authority and autonomy in Lhe vital are as of security and defence which allow them to be have as independently as possible in the international system. The European defence system was built -bOLhon a collective and a national lcvel -on the basis of an 'Atlantic' raLher than a 'European' logic. The presence of the US in Europe 'undermined' the necd for excessive defence armaments thus eliminating the systemic causes of pasL European conOicts. The histarical significance of the American presence lies in the facL thaL it contained the traditional compeLitive and conOictual tendencies in Europe as well as developed a network of Euro-American inSLiLuLionsand processes in the framework of which defence and sccurity policies were internationalised.
What should be clcar is Lhat American involvemenl and the Soviet threat lcd to 'Atlanticism' rather than the 'Europeanisation' of defence. The reactions of the major European powers to the tidal changes of Lhe ı990s is a testament to this thesis.
'Institutionalization' was chosen as the principled European security policy: the Conventional Armcd Forces (CFE) Treaty, the Confidence-and SecurityBuilding Measures (CSBM) agreements, the Paris Charter, the creatian of the NorLh Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the strengLhening of CSCE/OSCE's COnnicL prevenLion and peacekeeping machinery, NATO's 'Partnership for Peace' as well as the decisions taken in Berlin (ESDI and OTF) and in Madrid (NATO's enlargement) have aıready put the foundations of a new co-opcrative sccurity ordcr in place, 3. Institutional Imperatives of System Change: NATO's New Rationale
The discussion in the following pages considers brieOy, and by no means extensively, the internal dimension of the instİlutional responses of the Atlantic AlIiance LO the geopoJitical and geostrategic challenges of system change. it examines its development and analyses its relatianship with the overall European institutional environment: what we have leamed to call European 'security architecture'. The relatianship with the 'former enemies' and the enlargement strategy of the AlIiance will not be dealt with, not bccause it does not represent an important element of the overall strategy, but because it clcarly touches upon the external dimension of İl, thus going beyand the scopc of the analysis here.
VOL. XXVI
BoLh NATO's origins and Cold War hisLory are well known. What catalyzcd NA TO was a strong desire to link Europe and ılıe US (and Canada) in response LOthe SovieL ılırcal. NATO mollified European concems about a German Lhreat; contributed to a greaLer sense of West European unity and securiLy; and provided a mechanism for Lhe US Lo parLicipaLe in European economic and military reconstruCLion.
The pace of change in Lhe European order was, however, spectacular and iL fundamentally challenged NATO's raLionale and raison d'eLre. In just two shorL years (i 989-1991), Lhe core facLors that had contribuLed Lo NATO's creaLion (a divided Germany and the SovieL LhreaL) were gone. For NATO member staLes, there was greaL relief but great confusion as welL. it was at this moment thaL many analysts predicted 'LhaL absenL the SovieL threat, NATO would cease to be an eITecLive alliance',22 or even worsL, that 'is a disappearing thing'.23 A decade laLer such predicLions show liule sign of coming true.
The Alliance responded by attempting Lo adapt to the new security environment, stressing its poIiLical role and reorienLing its approach Lo issues of military docLrine, sufficiency, and readincss. The process of change in the Alliance began in 1990. IL was a process that would evenLually resulL in significanL reducLions in funding and force Icvels for NATO's convenLional and nuclear forces. JoinL weapons programmes, annual military exercises, readincss, nuclcar alen staLus, and training all have bccn sharply reduced.
More importantly, however, has been Lhe facL LhaLchange meant that NATO was secking Lo anchor iLSposition in ılıe New Europe and establish ılıe complementary naLure of other securiLy insLiLuLİons. In Manfred Womer's words,'our fuLure European archiLecLure will rest on a system of differenı organisations, someLimes overlapping, bul inLer-Iocking and, albeit wiıh a different focus, complememary,.24 In thaL conLexL, the ConcepL was sLressing the new political approach and undersLanding of seeurity in Europe. In Lhe new slraLegic circumsLances the Alliance planncd to resolve crises at an early sLage. It was reeogniscd that this required a coherent stnıtegy, which would coordinaLe a variety of connict management measures. In June 1992 the Alliance announced it was willing to support, on a case-by-case basis, peacekeeping under Lhe auspices of the CSCE. In December 1992 NATO pIcdged to supporL pcacekeeping under UN SeeuriLy Council authorisation.
NATO's New Strategic Concept
The StraLegic ConcepL finally underlined the importance of colleeLİve defence. The Coneept staLes that the Allianec will maintain an adequate miliLary capability and a cIear preparedness LOaCLcolleetively in the comman defence. A eommiLment was made Lo retain a mixture of nuclear and conventional forees, though at a mueh redueed levcI than in the past. NATO forces are however to be adapted to their new sLrategic roles. The overall size and readiness of forces was Lo be redueed. The mainLenanee of a lİnear defence in the Central European region was to be endcd. The Strategie Concept stressed nexibilily, mobility and an assured capabiliLy for augmentation. NATO forces are to be capable of responding LOa wide variety of challenges and are to eonsist of rapid reaction and main defence eomponenL'). The key elemenL was thaL NATO forees should be able to 'respond nexibly to a wide mnge of possible eontingencies'. The new strategie environment was seen to faeiliLaLe a significant redueLion in sub-sLnıLegic nucIear forces. Sub-strategie nuclear forces were seen however as an important link with strategic nueIcar forces, in partieular those of the UniLed SLates, which serve as the 'supreme guarantcc' of Allied seeurity.
The adopLion of the Strategic Coneept marked NATO's transition to the new seeurity environment of Europe. The challengc for the Allianee was to reaffirın its seeurity role in the new Europe and implement the new broad approach to stmtegy. In the immediate post-Cold War cm, NATO relained iL') posiLion as the primary forum for security in the new architecture. The revived WEU complemented NATO's institutional development in this period. As the relevant seetion below shows, WEU served to bridge NATO-25NATO, 'The Alliance's New Straıegic Concepı',~ATO Review, Vol. 39(6), 1991.
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EU reIations and to resolve for the foresecable future the tension between a European defence and security identity based upon the EU/WEU and the transatlantic basis that NATO provides.
A second feature of the new security architecture is the overlap of security in terms of its broader politica! interpretation. The broad approach to security adopted by NATO in its New Strategic Concept is reOected in the response of other institutions to the new European order. Preventive diplomaey, crisis management, and peacekeeping are themes shared by NATO, the WEU, the EU, and the OSCE. The OSCE has so me rccognition a<;the over-arching organisatian but is a considerable distance from being Europe's sccurity institution. ASPCCL<; of the OSCE role can alsa be secn in the EU's promotion of a European Stability Pact and the work of the NACC. While the lack of institutional definitian within the new security architecture is understandable, coordination remains imperative. The challcnge of implementing the broader political aspecı<;of strategy in the new Europc has been recognised by NATO in the need for a coherent and cohesive management of rcsponses to crises. This is a challenge not just for the Alliance but for the role and relationship of the 'interlocking institutions'. Thus, the Alliance had to transform its force structure in order to obtain and develop the capabilities that would enable it to deal with the newarising threats and challenges. The process was launchcd in September 1994, and the new military command structure was agrecd upon on 2 Dccembcr 1997.
The restructuring entails a reduction from the Cold War 65 headquarters to 20 in the new command structure. it consists of two overarching Strategic Commands (SC), one for the Atlantic and one for Europc, wİth three Regional Commands under SC Atlantic and two under SC Europc. Reporting to the Regianal Commands in Europe will bee Componcm Commands and Joint Sub-Regional Commands. It is envisaged that the new structure will enablc the Alliance to perform the wholc range of its rolcs and missions more effcctivcly and Oexibly, while providing suitable roles for participating allies integrating, at the same time the new membcrs. 26 
Berlin 1996 or the End of the European Security Debate?
The year was certainly annus mirabilis for it was then that the European Security and Defence Identity was c1arified and the European security architecture secmed coming together. NATO İn 1996 exemplified a transition from the structures that emerged from the Cold War and from contained confrontatian between the two superpowers to a new configuration 26In this context, it was determined that the accessian of the Czech Rcpublic, Hungary and Poland would not require any additional NATO HQs. See~ATO Review, Spring 1998, pp. 10-14. better adapted to the new geostrategic situation in Europe and the world at large. The crisis in form cr Yugoslavia gaye it an opportunity to demonstrate that it can exercise its military prowess on condition that it has the firm political resolve of governmcnts bchind it and that their objectives are e1early stated. The success of missions assigned to IFOR and work undertaken within the framework of PIP were evidence of the Alliance's ability to deal with present-day challenges and thus contribute to the political stability of the continenL 27
At the J une 1996 ministerial meeting of North Atlantic Council in Berlin, the idea was finally accepted of establishing European Security and Defence Identity within NATO and NATO's most radical plan, the CJTF concept, first introduced at the Brussels NATO summit in January 1994, was refined and its development was authorized. 28 The Berlin outcome was the major tuming point in the post-Cold War European security for it settlcd (at Icast for the foresccable future) the fundamental issues affecting the transatlantic bargaining: the primacy of NA TO; US Icadership of (not only) NATO; the contribution of the Europeans to the alliancc; and as a result theshaıt and medium term -prospects of a self-containcd European security and defence identity.
The communique endorsed the continuing 'internal adaptation' of NATO and dcfined the CJTF concept as 'central to our approach for assembling forces for (NATO) contigency operations' and 'operations Icd by the WEU'. And the wholc adaptation process would be 'consistent with the goal of building (ESDI) within NATO', enabling 'all European Alies to play a larger role in NATO's military and command structures and, ai) appropriate, in contigency operations undertakcn by the Alliancc'. It alsa referred to 'a continued involvement of the Noıth American AlIies across the command and force structure', with the clear aim of preserving and reinforcing the transatlantic link.
However, the fundamental objective was the development of ESDI within NATO. CJTF would be a vilal tool, Icading LO the 'creation of militarily cohcrent and cffective forces capablc of operating under the politicaI control and strategic directian of the WEU'. The primary intent of the CJTF 27 Asscrnbly of WEU, The Future Role of WEU. 28North Atlantic Council, 'Bcrlin Communiquc', Bcrlin, 3 Junc 1996, NATO Review, Vol. 44(4), 1996. A lengthy documcnt, thc Bcrlin communiquc touchcd upon aıı thc main issucs facing NATO: the situation in forrncr Yugoslavia and thc conduct of IFOR; the spread of nuclcar, biological and chemical wcapons of mass dcstruction; outrcach through NACC and PfP, and thc cnlargcmcnt timctablc; rclations with Russia and Ukrainc; thc rolc of the OSCE; thc Middlc East pcacc process; and disarmarncnt and arrns control. THE TURKISHYEARRCX)K VOL.XXVI concept was to give NATO military forces the mobility and Oexibility needed to execute the new tasks of the Alliance. Once fully in pIace, the new capabiliLİes would atlast fulfill the 1991 Alliance Stategic Concept's call for military authorilies to design smailer, more mobile and more Oexib\c forces. CJTF is a purely military concept, a technique long being used by many forces in the conduct of contigency warfare. NATO has been institutionalizing the task force concept in order to make it more effecLİve in the conduct of mulLİlateral opcrations. 29
Paul Cornish, in an atempt to 'deconstruct' the CJTF concept, successfully identifies the constituent e\cments of its nature and poliLİcal significance:30 first, Berlin shows c1early that NATO has firm ambitions to be a crisis manager and pcacekeeper in its own right, with the appropriate UN or OSCE mandatc. CJTF is a means to achieve this goal. To that end, the idea of a division of labour between NATO and the WEU, with the former responsib\c for collective defence (Artic\c 5 operations) and the laııer for lower-scale (non-Article 5) missions. If there is to be such a division of labour it could only be within the non-Article 5 category, with NATO taking 'hard' missions with fighting potenLİal and the WEU dealing with 'soft' humanitarian and rescue tasks. In other words, non-Article 5 operations were not the exclusive preserve of WEU. Second, CJTF is not simply 'a Eurofriendly afterthought in NATO's restructuring process, butlies at the hcart of that process' .31 it aims at providing an appropriate response across the spectrum of possib\c military tasks, ranging from the admiııedly unlikc1y collecLİve defence to non-Arlicle 5 needs for action. Third, via the NATO-WEU diplomatic relationship, CJTF is the pracLİcal means by which the ESDI within the Alliance will be given operational expression. In poliLİcal terms, it means that CJTF, as a US approved and NATO-sponsored idea, enables a US-controlled development and impIementation of ESDI. In the words of Comish, 'it is most unlikely that a serious rival to NA TO could now devclop '.32 What happened in Berlin was that NATO acquired eve n more credibility in mallers of security and defence than any conceivable rival. Strong US lcadership expressed not only the Allianee's post-Cold War adaptatian drive, but also in the forcefull US eammitment LOthe Dayton process and in the subsequent performance of IFOR, made NATO 29See C. L. Barry, 'NATO's CITF Concept and the WEU's Role in Crisis Rcsponsc', papcr presented in WEU Athens Seminar, 1-3 May 1997. 30p. Comish, 'European Security: the End of Archileeture and the New NATO', international Affalrs, Vol. 72(4). 1996. pp. 762-764. 31 According to M. Worner. the concept is 'the next logica1 step in the adaptation of our force stmctures'. Quoted Ibld., p. 763. 32lbid., p. 764. increasingly aııracLive to almosL every partieipant in the European seeurity debate, ineluding the Freneh,33 and Lhus repositioned it firmly as the dominanL determinanLof the posL-Cold War European seeuriLymorphology. This was 'eonfirmed' in Amsterdam where Lheprogression from Common Foreign and Seeurity Policy (CFSP) through Common Defence Policy to Common Defence seems LO remain, at besL,a long-tcrın aspiration. The prospccLsfor EU instituLion-building in defence proved indeed to be sliın,34 at Icast for the time beingo Amsterdam recognised the WEU as 'an integral part of Lhe development of the Union' and shall support (Lhe Union) 'in framing the defence aspecL~of Lhecommon foreign seeuriLypolicy (...) with a view LOLhe possibiliLy of Lhe integration of Lhe WEU into the Union, should LheEuropean Council so decide' (Artiele J.7.1), but it is obvious that integrationist expccLaLİons have becn reduced to hollow political rhetoric. The main significanee of LheWEU is thaLit enablcd a working compromise to be struck between integration and intergovernmentalisın, Atlantieism and Europeanism. 35 WiLhout increased poliLical, miliLary, and financial eoınınitmenL from the EU member suııes, it is hard to envisage the WEU bccoming more Lhanan -admiııedly vital -poliLieal expedient and turning into a coherent, self-eontained and miliLary effeetive body, thus bringing defence into the European integraLİonrealm.
Why NATO Endures
The above diseussion has been mainly abouL NATO's response and adapuıtion to Lhenew world, LhedevelopmenL of iL~sLraLegiesLawards Lhe The challenge was enormous as the possibility of deLerioration and dissolulion was indeed real. Alliances deteriorate and dissolve for several rcasons. The most obvious and important being a change in the idenLity or nature of threat that produced the original association. However, NATO endured. This durability has many sources. First, there is aleader, the US, strongly commiucd LO preserving the relationship and willing LO expend the effort needcd to keep iL<; allies from straying. American Icadership is not on tlıe wane but has bccn exercised effectively through credible institutional structures. And Lhatleads us to tlıe second source of NA TO pcrsistenee: it has occome symbol of credibility and resolve. The albeit rcluctant US decision to intervene in Bosnia (as well a<;its more recent resolute diplomatic response LO the Kosovo crisis) appears to have been motivated and by the fear thal failure to aet would east doubt on its reliability and therefore on NATO's future. Third, the high level of instiLutionalismion of NATO has created capabilities tlıaLare certainly wortlı preserving despite tlıe extensive change in the array of external threats, especially sinee it obviously eosts \ess LO maintain them than it did to establish them in the first place. As Walt has indicated, 'the 199 ıGulf War could not have bcen fought without NATO assets, and the ı995 intervention in Bosnia relied on a similar base of infrastructure, military assets and joint decision-making proeedures'.37 The great level of instiLutionalisation within NATO worked most powerfully oceause İl had creaLcd eapaeiLies that are highly adaptable. As tlıe foregoing diseussion shows, NATO durability was increased since its institutional profile was instrumental in amending doctrines and organisational forms in response to external developments, thereby making it easier to adapt to the new post-bipolar conditions. Fourth, idealagical solidarity and a commİlment to similar basic goals among NATO members, significantly helpcd LO rcduce intra-alliance conflicts and to sustain it long arter its original ratİonale is gone. Not only that, but the fact that NATO has resulted in its members secing tlıemselves as integral parts of a larger (AtIantİc) polilical community 3 6 Carr/Ifanlis, NATO in the New European Order, p. 158. 37S. M. Wall, 'Why Alliances Endurc or Collapse', Survlval, Vol. 39(1), 1997, p. 167.
and renected or even created a sense of common identity, means that the A1liance is undeniably appcaling and therefore extremcly robust.
Although, neİlher the history of the past 50 years nor the public statements of contemporary national leaders offer an absolutely reliable guide for the future, tlıe geostrategic developments and insLİtutional dynamics of the ı990s resulted in NATO remaining the landmark of post-Cold War European security. NATO stili is preparing to deal witlı tlıreats in true realist fashion, even tlıough their identities are increasingly in dispute or uncertain. What NATO has done in response -to realist and neorealist surprise -is to expand its relatianship to other international institutions, such as tlıe WEV and EV, 'as part of an effort to embed itself further into the framework of European, and to a Icsser extenttrans-Atlantic, relations. In so doing, NATO has demonstrated the flexibility expected of both organizations and international institutions'. 38
One can easily imagine, tlıatthese reasons which safeguarded NATO's efficient political and institutional adjustment, at the same time led to the decisions that were taken, or not taken, by the EV in Amsterdam. These decisions cast serious doubts as to whether 'the project of a true common European defence is still a real political objective being pursued by all governments of the relcvant European countries',39 and once again fuels the debate aboutthe EU's role in world affairs and its nalure as a global actor.
The criıical variable here, is that the calls for a more autonomous European defence system which could be subject to supranational processes of integraıion should not ignore national strategies and preferences. Successful implementation of Common Foreign and Securily Policy, Common Defence Policyand Common Defence will depend -as the Amsterdam outcome showed -less on legal obligaıions and more on favourable political and strategic variables and factOfS in the European regional and global arenas. VOL. XXVI agreed guidelines. Amsterdam revealcd that a modem European strategy document was not easy to write, given the very different foreign policy traditions of the different EU members and the uncertainty of the contemporary world. What Maastricht and Amsterdam have done is to identify defence as essential to EU construction. In such a context, a common security organisation becomes a means to a compelIing political end. Given this imperative, practical issues such as military planning, command structures, effcctiveness and efliciency are in danger of becoming subordinate considerations. This is against all histarical experience. The history of international relations since the Greek-Persian Wars has showed that states band together to meet perceived security threats; they do nOl forge defence structures to achieve a prcconceived political federation. The implcmentation of Amsterdam stands this logic on iı~head. The accelcrated move to creatc a more than intergovernmental defence regime as an (implicit) prccondition for eventual political union secms to ignore the fact that no functional equivalcnt to US strategic Icadership exisı<;in Europc, nar is one likely to emerge in the foresecable future. Moreover, regimes should nOl be viewed as progenitors of regional security communities that supplant national governments. This outcome is highly improbablc and might in the end prove to be dangerous. If states perceive that regimes are bcing constructed around and under them, they are apt to withdraw their coopcration with adverse consequences for peace and stability in Europc. Instead, the regime-building process should draw from states their common interests in redefining the terms of an inter-state sccurity community in Europc, recognising non-state actors as critica! supports for the process.
Alsa, successful regime-building requires identification and definitian of the threaL. The NATO experience has showed that there is a linear relationship between the internal cohesion of an alliance and the way in which membcrs perceive external threats and challenges. The nalUre of interstate rdations in post-Co Id War Europe has changed to such an extent that the definitian of a specific and identifiablc threat is very difficulL. The Soviet threat has bccn replaced by a complcx of Ouid and 'secondary' dangers: local or regiona! instability, civil and identity-based conOicts, revisionist tendencies in the regional sub-systems, nuelear proliferatİon and even potential resurrcction of past dangers like nationalist groups and parties in Russia. Failure of the EU member-states to define the nature and character of post-CoJd War threats could nOl only undermine the attempts to transform CFSP into 'defence policy', but could endanger the integration process in other fields. In that framework, the evolution of the European security institutional map in the I990s confinned that the compcıling task was not to create structures that derive from member-statcs' compulsions to assuage anxietics about the future, which will inevitably erode further the EU's credibility in defence and foreign policy by ignoring the heterogeneity of the European system, but to renovate the transatlantic security arrangements by shifting from a US-Icd system to a multilateral US-Icd and more EU-involved one.
lt should be clear, however, that this debate whilc focusing on failings and dilcmmas and on persistem limitations, it does not ignore the progress that European unity has made. Bouts of expansion both in geographical and functional scope have marked its history, and period s of pessimism and showdown have almost never Icd LO regressions. Stanlcy Hoffmann uses the image of Sisyphus only to suggest that the shape of the EU in Lhe 1990s 'is quite difTerent from the supnınational dream of its founders and Lhateach Icap forward brings with it problem s as well as reminders of constant handicaps,.40 However, prophccies of Iethal brcakups have not bccn fulfilled. Instead, il seems that Europeans, following Haas's suggestions,41 are trying to 'lcarn' and 'rcvalue' themselves by, at Icast, safeguarding their laboriously evolving acquis. And this process of 'lcamİng' and 'rccvaluaLİon' docs lead to a -painfull and slow -instituLİonal adaptation and policy innovation. The European Union is now a necessary, permanent and in some respect a Icading part of the European political and security landscape, and thus a subtle, if of ten shaky, actor in international geopolitics. The reality is that wc should not ignore the reality of the EU.
40S. Hoffmann,
The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964 -1994 , Boulder, 1995 
